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1 I. Introduction
During the latest decades, outsourcing has become an increasingly important
aspect of production. Outsourcing means that part of the production activity is located
to another country. Large wage differences across countries are most likely important
explanations for this behavior, as the production costs may be substantially reduced if
part of the production is located to a country with lower wages.1 When outsourcing and
domestic labor are substitutes, the domestic labor demand is decreasing and the wage
elasticity of domestic labor demand is increasing in the share of outsourcing, which
limits the mark-up labor unions can set above the opportunity cost of labor.
Outsourcing can take two alternative forms. Firms may write long-term contracts that
fix  the  amount  of  outsourcing  before  the  labor union sets the wage, i.e. strategic
outsourcing, or alternatively firms may be flexible enough later on to decide upon the
amount of outsourcing activity simultaneously with the domestic labor demand after the
domestic wage is set by the trade union.
In this paper we analyze the government revenue-neutral labor tax reforms,
associated with wage tax progression and combination between wage and proportional
payroll tax on wage setting, employment and outsourcing in the case of flexible
outsourcing under Nash wage bargaining concerning domestic wage determination.2
Wage taxation in OECD countries is progressive though the degree of progressivity
varies across countries, while payroll taxes are approximately proportional. There is no
earlier research on the role of revenue-neutral labor tax reforms in the presence of
outsourcing. Throughout the analysis, we assume that the economy is on the upward-
1 For a wide range of industries, wage differences across countries constitute central explanations
for outsourcing of production; see e.g. Sinn (2007). Of course, the wage differences alone
exaggerate the incentives for outsourcing, because these might also reflect productivity
differentials. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) present empirical evidence of a mismatch between the
new technologies developed in the rich economies and the skills of workers in less developed
countries and they argue that this burdens productivity in the less developed countries.
2        Because outsourcing can take two alternative forms, firms may write long-term contracts that fix
the amount of outsourcing before the labor union sets the wage. This case has been analyzed by
Skaksen and Sörensen (2001). They argue that if there is a high degree of substitutability
(complementarity) between the activities in the home country and in the host country, then ít is
likely that foreign direct investments reduce (increase) negotiated wages so that domestic worker
lose (benefit).
2sloping  part  of  the  Laffer  curve,  and  wages  are  determined  in  Nash  bargaining.  Also
Skaksen (2004) has analyzed the implications of flexible outsourcing for wage setting
and employment under imperfectly competitive labor markets, but  in  the  absence  of
taxation.3
With sufficiently strong (weak) labor market imperfections a lower outsourcing
cost and higher payroll tax have a wage-moderating (wage-increasing) effect. Polar
cases are a monopoly labor union, with which a lower outsourcing cost moderates
wages, and the absence  of  labor  market  imperfections,  in  which  case  there  is  no
relationship between outsourcing cost and wage formation and between payroll tax and
wage formation. In the presence of flexible outsourcing the wage tax has a positive
effect and the tax exemption a negative effect on the negotiated wage. In the absence of
outsourcing the payroll tax will have no effect on wage formation.
Increasing the degree of tax progression has a wage-moderating effect and a
positive  effect  on  domestic  employment  and  a  negative  effect  on  outsourcing.  These
qualitative results are qualitatively similar, but quantitatively different both in the case
of monopoly labor union and in the absence of outsourcing. Finally, government
revenue-neutral fall in the payroll tax and rise in the wage tax increases the negotiated
wage rate with sufficiently strong labor market imperfections, and have an ambiguous
effect with sufficiently weak labor market imperfections. A lower payroll tax and
higher wage tax will increase domestic labor demand and decrease international
outsourcing. Also in the absence of outsourcing a lower payroll tax and a higher wage
tax will increase domestic labor demand in the presence of wage tax exemption. But if
both taxes are proportional, then in the absence of outsourcing the employment
outsourcing effects of a change in wage and payroll tax to keep government revenue
constant are zero.
3        Danthine and Hunt (1994) have studied the effects of international outsourcing and foreign direct
investment (FDI) on wage formation in the home country by showing that higher product market
integration implies intensified product market competition, which moderates wage increases in
unionised labor markets. Zhao (1998) has studied the impact of FDI on wages and employment,
when labor-management bargaining is industry-wide by arguing that FDI reduces the negotiated
wage if the union focuses on wages. They have analyzed the effects of outsourcing in the absence
of taxation. It is an important new research topic to analyze the effects of taxation also under FDI
with domestic and outsourcing labor as other production factors. Hakkala et al. (2009) explore the
effects of cross-border acquisitions on wage elasticities empirically.
3This paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents the basic structure of
theoretical framework regarding some policy issues associated with various labor taxes,
wage formation, outsourcing and domestic labor demand. Domestic labor demand and
outsourcing are studied in section III, whereas wage determination through Nash
bargaining in the presence of linearly progressive wage tax and proportional payroll tax
is studied in section IV. The effects of tax-revenue neutral changes in terms of wage tax
progression and in terms of composition of wage tax and payroll tax on domestic wage
setting, employment and outsourcing are analyzed in section V. Finally, conclusions are
presented in section VI.
II.      Basic Framework
In this paper the focus is to study the effects of two tax-revenue neutral labor tax
on wage negotiation, domestic labor demand and outsourcing in the presence of flexible
outsourcing, when domestic labor demand and outsourcing are decided simultaneously
after the wage negotiation by the labor union and the firms. The time sequence is
described in Figure 1.
  stage 1                stage 2                   stage 3
                                                                                             time
      tax policy       Nash  wage          domestic labor demand
      decisions        bargaining            and outsourcing
Figure 1: Time sequence of decisions
At stage 1 the government behaves as a Stackelberg leader and fixes labor  tax
parameters in terms of revenue-neutrality for government. To raise revenues the
government can employ a wage tax t ,  which  is  levied  on  the  wage w ,  minus  a  tax
exemption a . The tax base per worker for the wage tax t  is )( aw? . In the presence of
a positive tax exemption a , the marginal tax rate t  exceeds  the  average  tax  rate
4)/1( wat ? so that the tax system is linearly progressive.4 The net-of-tax wage, the
worker receives, is given by .)1( tatwwn ???  The proportional payroll tax levied on
firms is s .  The  wage  tax  is  progressive  in  OECD  countries,  while  the  payroll  tax  is
approximately proportional (source: OECD (2004)) so that we therefore abstract from
an additional tax exemption for the payroll tax.  At stage 2 the labor union and the firm
negotiate on wages using the Nash bargaining approach. They take tax parameters as
given and anticipate the consequences that wage setting will have for the domestic
labor demand and outsourcing. At stage 3 the domestic labor demand and outsourcing
are decided simultaneously by the firm. The decisions at each stage are analyzed by
using backward induction.
To derive an explicit solution a decreasing returns to scale production function
is presented as
? ? ? ? ????
? 1
1
,
?
??? MLMLR , 1?? ,                                    (1)
where L  is the amount of labor employed in-house and M denotes the firm’s labor
input acquired from external suppliers through outsourcing. The parameter 1??  means
that the production function is an increasing and concave function of inputs.5 The
specification (1) of the production function implies that domestic labor and outsourced
4      For a seminal paper about tax progression, see Musgrave and Thin (1948), and for another
elaboration, see e.g. Lambert (2001, chapters 7-8).
5     Specifying the inverse product demand function according to a monopolistic product market
competition (see the seminar paper by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)) as 1,
1
1
???
? ??
? ?Dp  gives
the inverse elasticity of demand ?/1/ ?? pDpD  which means 1/ ??? ?DpDp . This
paper does not focus on the simultaneous presence of imperfections in labor and product markets
so that in this model the wage-moderating effect of outsourcing is independent of potential market
structure change in the product market. Lommerud et al. (2006) have demonstrated how
international mergers might curb the market power of unions giving socially excessive incentive
for international mergers, unless products are close substitutes. A somewhat related wage-
moderating effect of foreign investments is developed in Eckel and Egger (2006). They focus on
duopoly competition within a framework where the firms can produce either in one or both of two
identical countries. Within such a framework foreign market penetration induces a wage-
moderating effect in a unionized economy, because it improves the firm’s outside option relevant
for the wage negotiations. In these papers they abstract from taxation issues.
5input are substitutes with a productivity differential. The parameter 0??  captures the
productivity of outsourcing relative to the domestic labor input.6
The analysis starts with an investigation of domestic labor demand and
outsourcing and in the subsequent sections wage bargaining and tax policies are
characterized by applying backward induction.
I. Domestic Labor Demand and Outsourcing
At the last stage the firm decides simultaneously on domestic in-house
employment L  and outsourcing M to maximize the profit function
? ? ? )()1(1
1
,
MgLswMLMax
ML
??????
?
?
?
??
?? .                        (2)
When deciding on its labor demand and outsourcing, each firm takes as given the gross
wage for labor, )1(~ sww ?? , where s  is the proportional payroll tax levied on the firm.
In order to obtain M  units of outsourced unskilled labor input, we assume that firms
have to spend 25,0)( cMMg ?  with 0)(' ?? cMMg  and 0)('' ?? cMg . An
increasing marginal cost of outsourcing is assumed to capture the idea that some
activities are easier to outsource than others.
The first-order conditions are
? ? 0)1(1 ????? ? swMLL ??? ,                                          (3a)
? ? 01 ???? ? cMMLM ??? ?                                                (3b)
and equations (3a) and (3b) give the following explicit domestic labor demand and
6          Ethier (2005) has introduced a somewhat related production function to analyze the decision
between outsourcing and in-house production focusing on the effects of globalization on the skill
premium.
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Domestic labor demand is a negative function of the domestic gross wage rate and the
productivity of outsourcing, and a positive function of the cost of outsourcing, while
outsourcing is a positive function of the domestic gross wage rate and productivity of
outsourcing and a negative function of the cost of outsourcing. This means that higher
outsourcing will decrease domestic labor demand.8 Higher  payroll  tax  will  decrease
domestic labour demand and increase outsourcing, ceteris paribus.
The outsourcing elasticities in terms of outsourcing cost, productivity of
outsourcing, domestic wage and payroll tax are: ,1??
M
cM c ,1?
M
M ?? 1?
M
wM w  and
1)1( ??
M
sM s .
The wage elasticity and the payroll tax elasticity of labor demand under flexible
outsourcing can be expressed as
.)1()1(
)1())1((
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*
2
L
sL
L
M
L
M
L
c
swsw
L
wLcsw swf ??????
???
???
?
???
??
??
?
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 and these depend on parameters ? , w , s  and c .9 In the case of production function
(1)  in  the  absence  of  outsourcing  the  wage  elasticity  and  the  payroll  tax  elasticity  of
labor demand are constant, i.e.
L
sL
L
wL sw
M
)1(
0
??????? ?? .
7         The associated second-order conditions are 0)(1
)1(
????
?? ?
?
??? MLLL ,
02 ??? cLLMM ???  and .0)( 2 ???? LLLMMMLL c????
8         See e.g. Görg and Hanley (2005) and Hijzen et al. (2005) for evidence based on various data sets.
9      The production function (1) has been analyzed by Koskela and Stenbacka (2008) by studying the
impact of strategic outsourcing on equilibrium unemployment in the absence of labor taxation.
7The relationship between the wage rate and the wage elasticity of domestic
labor demand is positive
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*
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and the relationship between the outsourcing cost and the wage elasticity of domestic
labor demand is negative
.0)1()1()1( *
*
*
*
2 ???????
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c ??????                                (6b)
Higher outsourcing due to lower outsourcing cost will increase the wage elasticity (and
payroll tax elasticity) of domestic labor demand, which lies in conformity with
empirical evidence from various data sets. Senses (2006) has provided empirical
evidence according to which a production mode with more outsourcing seems to
increase the wage elasticity of labour demand. Also Slaughter (2001) and Hasan et al.
(2007) have shown that international trade has increased the wage elasticity of labour
demand.10
The relationship between the payroll tax and the wage elasticity of domestic
labor demand is also positive, i.e.
0
)1(
)1)(1()1( *
*
2 ???????
?
??
? ???
Ls
M
L
MLLM fssf
s ?????? .                              (6c)
10      Lommerud et al. (2009) have presented a theoretical model with monopolistic competition to
determine how unionization affects the fraction of outsourced inputs. In their model they argue
that in equilibrium stronger labor market imperfections decrease the fraction of outsourced inputs
because higher outsourcing reduces the wage elasticity for the components produced in-house,
thereby leading to higher domestic wage. This does not lie in conformity with empirical evidence
which has been mentioned. Lommerud et al. (2009) have abstracted from taxation issues which
has our focus in this paper.
8One  can  also  show  that  higher  productivity  of  outsourcing  will  increase  the  wage
elasticity, i.e. 0?f?? .
IV. Wage Determination via Nash Bargaining under Linearly
Progressive Wage Tax and Proportional Payroll Tax
We now proceed to investigate wage determination by applying the Nash
bargaining solution following the right-to-manage (RTM) approach (see e.g. Cahuc and
Zylberberg (2004), Ch 7) so that wage negotiation takes place in anticipation of optimal
domestic labor and outsourcing decisions. The labor union’s objective function in the
presence of linearly progressive wage taxation is assumed to be
)())1((ˆ ** LNbLtatwU ????? , where the tax base for the wage tax t  equa1s
*)( Law? , where there is a positive tax exemption a . b  is the (exogenous) outside
option available to union members and N is  the  number  of  union  members  ( )*LN ?
and the threat point is NbU o ?  so that the relevant objective function of the labor
union is ))1((ˆ * btatwLNbUU ?????? .
Following the Nash bargaining approach the firm and the labor union negotiate
with respect to wage rate so as to solve the following optimization problem
? ? ?
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?
?
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?
??
? ????????
1
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2
1)1(),())1(( cMLswMLRbtatwLMax
w
              (7)
               s.t. ))1(())1((
c
swswL ???? ? ??? ,
where *)1( M
c
sw ???  is the optimal flexible outsourcing and the relative bargaining
power of the labor union is ?  and that of the firm is ??1 . The first-order condition
for the negotiated wage rate can be written as
90)1(0 *
*
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??? www U
U ,                                                      (8)
where
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? ?.2
)1(21
2
1
1)1(1
*
*
f
ML
Lw
wMRLRR
LR
w
Lsw
w ??
?
??
?
??
???
??
?
??
? ??
?????             (9b)
 where *
*
)1(22
L
Mf ??? ????? (see Appendix A concerning (9b)).
Substituting the equations (9a) and (9b) into the first-order condition (8) gives
after calculations the following Nash bargaining solution for the negotiated wage (see
Appendix A)
bAbw fff
ff
N ˆˆ
)1(2)1()2)(1(
)1(2)1()2( ???????
?????? ??????
?????? ,                                   (10)
where the outside option in the presence of tax parameters is
t
tabb ?
??
1
ˆ  and using the
notation *
*
)1(2
L
MZ ?????  and *
*
)1(
L
Mf ???? ???  the mark-up fA  can be
written as follows
1
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01 ?? ? .  The mark-up is not dependent on wage tax parameters, but it is affected by
the payroll tax in the presence of outsourcing because payroll tax will affect the wage
elasticity of domestic labor demand (see equation (6c)). In the absence of outsourcing
10
the Nash wage bargaining solution is bAbw
M
N ˆˆ
)1(
)1(
0
??
???
? ?
?? , which only depends
on wage tax parameters, bargaining power to the labor union and decreasing returns to
scale of production function, but in the case of production function (1) payroll tax will
have no effect on the mark-up.
It is important to mention that equation (10) is not an explicit form for the wage
rate under outsourcing because the mark-up both in terms of the numerator and the
denominator also depends in a non-linear way on the wage ratio via the ratio between
outsourcing and domestic labor demand (see equation (4a)). According to (10) the
negotiated wage rate depends positively both on the outside option including tax
parameters, bˆ , and the relative bargaining power of the labor union, ? , and
negatively on the wage elasticity of domestic labor demand, f? .
In the case of the monopoly labor union with outsourcing we have also the
following implicit form from (10)
bbw f
f
ff
ff
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)1(
ˆ
)2)(1(
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?
.                                      (11)
In the absence of outsourcing the Nash wage bargaining solution (10) for the wage rate
is explicit, i.e. bw
M
N ˆ
)1(
1
0 ?
???
? ?
??  as well as in the case of monopoly labor union, i.e.
bw
M
N ˆ
)1(0,1 ?
?
?? ?
?
?
 and if 0?? , then bww
M
N
M
N ˆ
0,00,0
??
???? ??
.  In these cases the
payroll tax will have no effect on the mark-up and therefore no effect on wage
 formation by using the production function (1), i.e. 0
0
??
?
?M
N
s
w .
By differentiating the negotiated wage (10) with respect to the outsourcing cost
c  gives (see Appendix B)
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)1(2))1(2(
)1(2
2
*
*
????
??
???
?
L
M
F .  The relationship (12)
characterizes how the lower outsourcing cost can decrease wage setting if the relative
bargaining power of labor union is higher than the low threshold F , where
???? ????? f
L
M 2)1(2 *
*
. This threshold, which is strictly between zero and one, is
inversely related to the wage elasticity f? . Lower outsourcing cost increases the wage
elasticity of domestic labor demand by decreasing the mark-up. This is the dominant
effect as long as the labor union has a sufficiently strong bargaining power. However,
as (8) makes clear, the wage is predominantly determined by the negative effects on
profits when the labor union has a sufficiently low bargaining power. Under such
circumstances increased outsourcing due to lower outsourcing cost moderates the
profit-reducing effect of a higher wage. In this case more outsourcing induces an
increase in the wage when the bargaining power lies with the firm to a sufficient
degree.
Under the monopoly labor union the mark-up is
11 ??? f
f
fA ?
?
?
 so that in this
case the lower outsourcing cost will decrease the mark-up, i.e. 0
)1( 21
??
??
? f
f
cf
cA ?
?
?
.
In the absence of labor market imperfections, this effect is zero.
By differentiating the negotiated wage (10) with respect to the payroll tax s
gives (see Appendix B)
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(13) characterizes how the higher payroll tax can decrease wage if the relative
bargaining power of labor union is higher than the low threshold F . This threshold, as
we mentioned earlier, is inversely related to the wage elasticity. Higher payroll tax
increases the wage elasticity of domestic labor demand by decreasing the mark-up.
This is the dominant effect as long as the labor union has a sufficiently strong
bargaining power. Also wage is affected by the negative effect on profit according to
(9b) and when the labor union has a sufficiently low bargaining power, higher
outsourcing due to higher payroll tax moderates the profit reducing effect of a higher
wage.
Under the monopoly labor union , where
11 ??? f
f
fA ?
?
?
, so that in this case the
higher payroll tax will decrease the mark-up, i.e. 0
)1( 21
??
??
? f
f
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sA ?
?
?
, but there will
be no effect in the absence of outsourcing in the case of production function (1),
because 0
0
?
?M
f
s? .  In  the  absence  of  labor  market  imperfections,  this  effect  is  also
zero.
In terms of the wage tax and the tax exemption differentiating (10) gives
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In the case of monopoly trade union, 1?? , these findings (14a) and (14b) are
qualitatively similar, because these tax parameters only affect via the outside option
t
tabb ?
??
1
ˆ , and not via the mark-up of wage formation. It is also easy to show that in
the absence of outsourcing we have qualitatively similar results, i.e.
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These results can be summarized in
Proposition 1: In the presence of flexible outsourcing
(a) with sufficiently strong (weak) labor market imperfections under Nash
wage bargaining a lower outsourcing cost and higher payroll tax have a
wage-moderating (wage-increasing) effect, and
(b) with a monopoly labor union, a lower outsourcing cost moderates wages
and in the absence of labor market imperfections there is no relationship
between outsourcing cost and wage formation and between payroll tax
and wage formation, and
(c) in the absence of outsourcing payroll tax will have no effect on wage
formation,  whereas
(d) both in the presence and in the absence of flexible outsourcing the wage
tax has a positive effect and the tax exemption a negative effect on
negotiated wage.
According to these findings both lower outsourcing cost and higher payroll tax will
have a wage moderating effect under Nash wage bargaining as long as the labor union
has a sufficiently strong bargaining power. Of course, this fully works in the case of
monopoly labor union.
V.     The  Impacts  of  Revenue-Neutral  Labor  Tax  Reforms  on  Wage
Formation, Employment and Outsourcing
We now turn to analyze the impacts of tax-revenue neutral changes in wage tax
progression and of the composition of wage tax and payroll tax on the negotiated wage,
domestic employment and outsourcing.
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V.1.     Revenue-neutral increase in wage tax progression
Here the analysis concentrates on the effects of wage tax progression under
government revenue-neutrality for wage formation, employment and outsourcing.11 The
average tax rate progression ( ARP ) is given by the difference between the marginal tax
rate t  and the average tax rate )1(
w
atta ?? . The tax system is progressive if
w
tattARP a ??? is positive and tax progression is increased if att ?  increases.
Government can raise the degree of tax progression when it increases t  and
adjusts a  upwards. The effect of wage tax progression  -  which keeps the government
tax-revenue ? ?LswawtG NN ??? )(  constant  -  can be written in terms of wage tax t ,
tax exemption a  and by allowing change in wage formation Nw  in the following way:
? ? NwNNN dwLswawtLsttLdaLdtawdG ))(()()(0 ????????? . This can be written
in the absence of change in the payroll tax s  by using equation (5),  i.e. fw
L
wL ??? , as
Nf
N
f
N
dsdG dww
a
t
sdt
t
awda ??
?
??
? ???????? ?? )1)(1(
)(
0,0 .                         (15)
The total effect of changes in tax parameters t  and a  on the negotiated domestic wage
rate is da
a
wdt
t
wdw
NN
N
?
???
??   and substituting the RHS of (15) for da  gives
0
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0,0
??
????
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?
?? D
a
w
t
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t
w
dt
dw
NNN
dsdG
N
,                                              (16)
11       In the case of flexible outsourcing and Nash wage bargaining Koskela (2008) has not analyzed the
role  of  composition  of  wage tax  and payroll  tax,  but  analyzed the  issue  by  concentrating  on  the
effects of tax progression in the case of tax reform that increases tax progression, while keeping
the average tax burden per worker constant and therefore by abstracting from the fully- balanced
public sector tax-revenue. Therefore, the focus here is new in the presence of flexible outsourcing.
15
where
? ?
0))( ??
????
?
??
a
w
t
aw
t
w NNN  and 0)1)(1(1 ???
?
??
? ????
??? fNf
N
w
a
t
s
a
wD ??  in the
assumption of the presence of the positive Laffer curve12 (see Appendix C). Higher
wage tax will have a positive effect on wage, and higher tax exemption a negative
effect and the latter effect in the nominator of (16) dominates. Concerning the sign of
denominator tax exemption affects the tax revenue G  both directly and also indirectly
via behavioral responses. If the direct effect dominates under the positive Laffer curve,
then the relationship between tax revenue and tax exemption is positive. This implies
that tax revenue is negatively related to tax exemption a  so that and the relationship
between tax revenue and tax exemption is negative which means that 0?D  (see
equation (C2) in Appendix C). Hence in the case of the positive Laffer curve the
revenue neutral increase in wage tax progression will moderate the negotiated wage
under Nash wage bargaining.13 In the absence of outsourcing the qualitative finding is
similar, i.e. 0
0,0,0
?
??? dMdsdG
N
dt
dw .14
            The total employment and outsourcing effects of changes in wage tax
parameters t  and a  and in the negotiated wage on employment and outsourcing are
N
wdwLdL ?  and NwdwMdM ? , which give using (4a), (4b) and (16) as follows
12 Trabandt and Uhlig (2006) have examined the shape of the Laffer curve to the US as well as to the
EU-15 economy over the period 1975-2000. According to their model the US and the EU-15 area
are located on the left side of their Laffer curve, i.e. in the case of positive Laffer curve. Using the
US data Fullerton (1982) also earlier argued that the notion of an inverse relationship between
major U.S. tax rates and government revenues does not work.
13       Koskela (2008) has provided a qualitative similar result but by keeping the average tax burden per
worker constant and by abstracting from the fully-balanced public sector tax-revenue. Koskela and
Schöb (2008) have analyzed also the impact of labor tax reform changes in the wage tax rate, the
tax exemption by increasing the degree of tax progression to keep the relative tax burden per
worker  constant  in  the  case  of  monopoly  labor  union  both  in  the  case  of  strategic  and  flexible
outsourcing and they received the same qualitative result.
14       See e.g. Koskela and Vilmunen (1996), where this has been analyzed both in the absence of
outsourcing and without the payroll tax levied on the firms. Equation (C1) from Appendix C can
be written in the absence of outsourcing as follows
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so that under the positive Laffer curve assumption a revenue-neutral increase in wage
tax progression will increase domestic employment and decrease international
outsourcing.
We can now summarize our findings of revenue-neutral change in wage tax
progression in terms of wage formation, domestic employment and international
outsourcing as follows.
Proposition 2: In the presence of flexible outsourcing and imperfectly
competitive domestic labor markets
(a) a higher wage tax and higher tax exemption under government revenue-
neutral change will decrease the negotiated wage rate, and
(b) a higher wage tax and higher tax exemption under government revenue-
neutral change will increase domestic labor demand and decrease
international outsourcing.
It is important to emphasize that the impact of degree of wage tax progression is
qualitatively similar in the absence of outsourcing. Then the wage tax parameters do
not affect the mark-up of wage formation.
V.2.     Revenue-neutral changes in the composition of wage and payroll taxes
Government can also raise the degree of average tax progression, i.e.
w
tattARP a ??? , when it increases t  and adjusts s  downwards. The effect of change
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in the composition of wage tax and payroll tax, which keeps the government tax-
revenue ? ?LswawtG NN ??? )(  constant,  can  be  written  in  terms  of  wage  tax t  and
payroll tax s  and allowing the change in wage negotiation Nw  in  the  absence  of
change in the wage tax exemption a  in the following way
? ?? ? ? ? NwNNsNNNN dwLswawtLstdsLswawtLwLdtawdG ))(()()()(0 ????????????
This can be written by using equation (5), i.e.
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In this case the tax base of the wage tax, Law )( ? ,  is  smaller  than  in  the  case  of
proportional payroll tax , wL . The total effect of changes in tax parameters t  and s  on
the negotiated domestic wage rate is ds
s
wdt
t
wdw
NN
N
?
???
??   and substituting the
RHS of (18) for ds  gives after calculations as follows
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where in the assumption of the presence of the positive Laffer curve the denominator
0)()1)((1 1 ???
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w
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s
ws
w
tastwE ?? in (19) is
positive, so that the direct effects of payroll tax dominate the behavioral responses (see
Appendix C).  If we are in the upward-sloping part of the Laffer curve a revenue-
neutral increase in wage tax parameter t  goes along with a lower payroll tax s .
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Concerning the sign of nominator of (19), we have under the assumption
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?? according to equation (13). Therefore, higher
wage tax and lower payroll tax increase the negotiated wage under Nash wage
bargaining if the bargaining power of labor union is higher or equal to the threshold F .
If the bargaining power of the labor union is low enough, then 0??
?
s
wN  so that the
total  effect  of  a  change  in  the  composition  of  wage  tax  and  payroll  tax  on  the
negotiated wage Nw is a priori ambiguous.
In this model in the absence of outsourcing equation (19) in the case
0??
?
s
wN can be written as
0
)1(1
1
)1)((1
)1)((1
2
1
1
0,0,0
??
?
?
????
??
??
?
??
? ????
??
?
??
? ?????
?
?
?
?
??? t
ab
t
w
s
w
tastw
s
w
tastw
t
w
dt
dw N
N
N
N
N
N
MdadG
N
?
??
?
?
                                                                                                                                (19’)
as ab ?  so that increasing wage tax t  and  decreasing  payroll  tax s  (to keep tax
exemption a  constant) will increase the negotiated wage setting which is also
qualitatively same as in the case if the bargaining power of labor union is higher or
equal to the threshold F .
The total employment and outsourcing effects of changes in wage tax parameter
t  and  payroll  tax  parameter s  and the negotiated wage on employment and
outsourcing are dsLdwLdL s
N
w ??  and dsMdwMdM sNw ?? . These give using
(4a), (4b) and (19) after calculations when Nsw w
sLL )1( ??  and Nsw w
sMM )1( ??  the
following results (see Appendix C)
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 in  the  case  of
positive wage tax exemption. Therefore, a lower payroll tax and a higher wage tax to
keep tax revenue-neutrality constant will increase domestic employment and decrease
outsourcing. But if both taxes are proportional so that the tax bases are equal, then
revenue-neutral changes in the composition of wage tax and payroll tax become
irrelevant so that these do not affect domestic employment and outsourcing (see
equation (C10) in Appendix C).15
In the absence of outsourcing equation (20a) by using equation (C6) from
Appendix C can be written as
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where 0
)1)(1(1
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0
??????
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?
? t
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aw
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NN
?
?  as 0?a  so that 0
0,0,0
?
??? MdadGdt
dL  as
0?a .  This means that also in the absence of outsourcing increasing wage tax t  and
decreasing payroll tax s  will increase domestic labor demand in the presence of tax
exemption. But if both taxes are proportional, then also in the absence of outsourcing
15        Heijdra and Ligthart (2009) have studied a simple labor tax reform of reducing a payroll tax and
increasing  a  progressive  wage tax  in  a  search  and matching model  along the  lines  of  Pissarides
(2000) in a micro-founded macroeconomic model of a small open economy but in the absence of
outsourcing. They argue that such a strategy increases employment. Like in our paper they have
also abstracted from physical capital, which is an important new research topic.
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the employment effect of a change in wage and payroll tax to keep government revenue
constant is zero.16
We can now summarize our findings of revenue-neutral change in lower payroll
tax and higher wage tax in terms of wage formation, domestic employment and
international outsourcing as follows.
Proposition 3: In the presence of flexible outsourcing and imperfectly
competitive domestic labor markets
(a) a lower payroll tax and higher  wage tax under revenue-neutral change
increase the negotiated wage rate with sufficiently strong labor market
imperfections, and it will have an ambiguous effect with sufficiently weak
labor market imperfections, and
(b) a lower payroll tax and higher  wage tax under revenue-neutral change
will increase domestic labor demand and decrease international
outsourcing in the presence of wage tax exemption, and
(c) in the absence of outsourcing a lower payroll tax and a higher  wage tax
under revenue-neutral change will also increase domestic labor demand
in the presence of wage tax exemption, whereas
(d) in the absence of wage tax exemption the revenue-neutral changes in the
composition of wage tax and payroll tax do not affect domestic
employment and outsourcing.
It is important to emphasize that the impact of a lower payroll tax and higher wage tax
under revenue-neutral change is qualitatively, but not quantitatively, similar both in the
presence and in the absence of outsourcing in the case of the positive Laffer curve.
16        In the absence of outsourcing this has been shown e.g. in Koskela and Schöb (1999).
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VI.     Conclusions
We have studied in this paper the following questions under homogenous
domestic labor market and outsourcing: What are the effects of outsourcing costs,
productivity of outsourcing, and domestic wage and payroll tax levied on firms on the
wage elasticity of labor demand in the presence of flexible outsourcing? What are the
effects of outsourcing costs and productivity of outsourcing, wage tax, tax exemption
and payroll tax on wage formation in an imperfectly competitive labor market when
labor unions and firms negotiate wages under Nash bargaining? Finally, and
importantly, what are the effects of two alternative labor tax reforms on domestic wage
setting and domestic employment as well as on outsourcing in the case of government
revenue neutral changes in terms of labor tax reforms. Wage taxation in OECD
countries is progressive though the degree of progressivity varies across countries,
while payroll taxes are approximately proportional. These are new research topics in
the case of outsourcing by focusing the role of revenue-neutral labor tax reforms under
Nash wage bargaining.
We have shown that in the presence of flexible outsourcing the wage elasticity
of domestic labor demand is a decreasing function of the outsourcing cost and an
increasing function of the wage rate and payroll tax of domestic labor and productivity
of outsourcing. With sufficiently strong (weak) labor market imperfections a lower
outsourcing cost and higher payroll tax have a wage-moderating (wage-increasing)
effect.  Polar  cases  are   a  monopoly  labor  union,  with  which   lower  outsourcing  cost
moderates wages, and  the absence of labor market imperfections, in which case there
is no relationship between outsourcing cost and wage rate and between payroll tax and
wage rate. In the presence of flexible outsourcing the wage tax has a positive effect and
the tax exemption a negative effect on the negotiated wage. In the absence of
outsourcing payroll tax will have no effect on the negotiated wage.
Increasing the degree of tax progression under Nash wage bargaining, to keep
the government tax revenue as constant has a wage-moderating effect and a positive
effect on domestic employment and a negative effect on outsourcing. These qualitative
results on wage formation and domestic employment are qualitatively similar, but
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quantitatively different both in the case of monopoly labor union and in the absence of
outsourcing.
 We have also shown that in the presence of flexible outsourcing a revenue-
neutral increase in the degree of wage tax progression by raising the wage tax and the
tax exemption will decrease the negotiated wage rate, and will increase domestic labor
demand and decrease international outsourcing. Finally, we have shown when the
economy is  on  an  upward-sloping  part  of  the  Laffer  curve,  a  lower  payroll  tax  and  a
higher wage tax rate under a revenue-neutral change increase the negotiated wage rate
with sufficiently strong labor market imperfections, and it will have an ambiguous
effect with sufficiently weak labor market imperfections. A lower payroll tax and
higher wage tax under revenue-neutral change will increase domestic labor demand and
decrease international outsourcing in the presence of wage tax exemption. But if both
taxes are proportional, so that the tax bases are equal then revenue-neutral changes in
the  composition  of  wage  tax  and  payroll  tax  do  not  affect  domestic  employment  and
outsourcing Also in the absence of outsourcing a lower payroll tax and a higher wage
tax under revenue-neutral change will increase domestic labor demand in the presence
of wage tax exemption. But if both taxes are proportional, then the employment effects
of a change in wage and payroll tax to keep government revenue constant are zero.
Future research might take several new directions. We have completely
neglected the role of physical capital in production as a means to affect the resources
spent on outsourcing. Allowing for physical capital could broaden the income tax base.
If domestic labor and capital are complements in production – and as long as the
government lacks a direct instrument for controlling outsourcing – capital income
taxation might be a useful tool to increase the productivity of domestic labor. The
interpretations of our model could also most likely be extended to cover foreign direct
investment  (FDI)  in  a  world  with  labor,  domestic  and  foreign,  as  the  only  production
factor in the following respect. The implications of outsourcing and FDIs are related
aspects. An increase in the opportunities for outsourcing and FDI tends to increase the
labor demand elasticity, but there may also be other strategic effects of outsourcing and
FDI. In the long run the firm could commit to an FDI program, which makes it possible
to exploit low-cost workers in the foreign country with no labor market imperfections.
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Within such a framework the crucial mechanism of our model focuses on how firms
can make use of strategic FDI-commitments as a wage-moderating device.
Interestingly, the strategic wage-moderating effect of the FDI may be realized with no
reference to potential product market imperfections.17
Moreover, the resources that domestic firms spend on outsourcing will give rise
to welfare effects in other countries. This suggests that uncoordinated policies might be
inefficient from the perspective of society as a whole, and that outsourcing may provide
an argument for policy coordination across countries. This has been studied by
Aronsson and Sjögren (2004) in the absence of outsourcing.
Appendix A: Implicit Nash wage bargaining solution
Taking labor demand (4a) and outsourcing (4b) into account we find
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which gives (9b). Substituting equations (9a) and (9b) into the first-order condition (8)
gives
? ? )1(2))()1()(1()2()()1)(1( ???????????? ???????? tabtwtabtw fff ,  (A2)
and (A2) implies the implicit Nash bargaining solution (10). QED.
17     Glass and Saggi (1999, 2001) have theoretically studied the consequences of foreign direct
investment (FDI) policies in a general equilibrium setting with several oligopolistic industries.
They find that higher international outsourcing lowers the relative wage of domestic workers and
increases the profits, creating greater incentives for innovation.
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Appendix B: Nash wage bargaining, outsourcing cost and payroll tax
By differentiation of Nash wage bargaining equation (10) with respect to the wage rate
and outsourcing cost gives
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The effect of outsourcing cost on the nominator of equation (B1) depends on the
relative bargaining power of the labor union and the threshold as follows
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Differentiating the mark-up with respect to the wage rate gives by using 0?? fwwZ ?
? ? ? ?
? ?? ?
2
2
2
)1(2)1(2((
)1()(
X
Z
X
ZZZXZZXA
f
w
w
ff
ww
ff
wf
w
??????
??????
?????
?????????
                                  (B5)
so that the effect of the wage rate on the mark-up is
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By using (B3) and (B5) the equation (B1) can be expressed as follows
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where the denominator is positive so that we have
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By differentiation of Nash wage bargaining equation (10) with respect to the wage rate
and payroll tax gives
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The effect of outsourcing cost on the mark-up under Nash wage bargaining depends on
the relative bargaining power of the labor union as
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By using (B10) and (B5) the equation (B9) can be expressed as follows
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where the denominator is positive so that we have the following conclusion
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Appendix C: Revenue-neutral labor tax reform calculations associated
with wage formation, employment and outsourcing
Substituting equations (14a) and (14b) into the numerator or equation (16) yields
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because bwN ˆ?  in the presence of the mark-up 1?fA .
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under the positive Laffer curve assumption so that the denominator in (16) is positive,
i.e., 0?D , under the assumption that the direct effects of tax exemption dominate the
behavioral responses and will have a negative effect on government revenue.
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Concerning the denominator of (C4) the total differential of government revenue
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so that 0?E  under the assumption that the direct effects of payroll tax dominate the
behavioral responses , i.e. it will have a positive effect on government revenue in the
presence of the positive Laffer curve. Using the RHS of (18) for ds  in
dsLdwLdL s
N
w ??  and Nsw w
sLL )1( ??  gives the following result
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where fNw
tastsY ?)(1 ????? . And using the RHS of (18) for ds  in
dsMdwMdM s
N
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In the presence of outsourcing equation (C4) can be written as
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Associated with equations (C6) and (C7) we now calculate the following
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Using XYt ˆˆ1 ???  equation (C9) can be rewritten as follows
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By using equation (13) one can show that 1
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Therefore, in the presence of outsourcing we have
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